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IS JOB TURNOVER COUNTERCYCLICAL?
Tito Boeri




In recent years several models have been developed in an attempt to 
explain countercyclical movements of job turnover, the sum of gross job 
creation and destruction rates. However, evidence on the behaviour over 
the cycle of job turnover is far from conclusive. Based on data on eight 
OECD countries, this paper shows that only in the US a negative and 
statistically significant correlation between job turnover and employment 
growth is observed. In the other countries, job turnover is either acyclical 
or mildly procyclical. Neither do institutional differences among the 
various labour markets — e.g., related to the degree of "strictness" of 
employment security regulations — seem to account for these asymmetries 
in the cyclical behaviour of job turnover between the US and the other 
countries. Rather than being associated to the greater flexibility of the US 
compared to the western European labour markets, these asymmetries in 
the cyclical behaviour of gross job flows have to do with statistical 
artifacts, namely with the little coverage offered by job turnover statistics 
in the US of the small business sector and with regression to the mean 
effects. The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 1 reviews the 
theoretical literature on countercyclical job flows. Section 2 provides an 
assessment of available data on job turnover in various countries. Section 
3 presents evidence on the behaviour of job turnover rates over the cycle 
in eight OECD countries. Sections 4 and 5 discuss some possible 
explanations for the observed asymmetries in the cyclical properties of 
job turnover between the US and the other countries. Finally, Section 6 
highlights other puzzling characteristics of job turnover that have so far 
received little, if any, attention by theoreticians.
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Is Job Turnover Countercyclical?
Tito Boeri
European University Institute and OECD1
Facts can be stylized for establishing a basis for models, but, after all, they 
must be facts and the way in which empirical evidence is given the status of 
"stylized fact" is sometimes at least debatable. Typical is the case of the literature 
aimed at explaining countercyclical movements of job turnover, the sum of gross 
job creation and destruction rates. There are today several models, which can 
account for a larger reallocation of jobs during recessions than during cyclical 
upturns. However, we will show in this paper that the posited countercyclical 
properties of job turnover are not adequately supported by empirical evidence. In 
the few cases where a negative and statistically significant correlation between 
aggregate employment dynamics and gross job reallocation is observed, this may 
be attributed to a statistical artifact, namely the regression to the mean size of the 
largest units in the sample.
Improving our knowledge of the behaviour of gross job flows over the cycle 
is important not only to refine and calibrate models, but also to assess the scope 
for stabilisation policies and their impact on economic restructuring. If cyclical 
downturns are associated with faster processes of modernisation of the economy, 
then fiscal and monetary stabilisation policies may also end up delaying the 
restructuring process. Similarly, if changes in the pace of job reallocation reflect 
mainly changes in the intensity of firm-specific shocks, rather than firms’ responses 
to aggregate shocks, then demand management policies may be rather ineffective 
in reducing employment fluctuations.
The posited countercyclical properties of job turnover have also been used 
to make inferences on the behaviour over the cycle of other (often unobserved) 
labour market flows, like job-to-job shifts and unemployment outflows originated 
by the filling of positions temporarily left vacant rather than by the genuine creation 
of new jobs. Job turnover is defined and empirically measured as a sum of first 
differences in employment levels of individual establishments. Hence, the dif­
ference between labour turnover (the sum of hirings and separations) and job 
turnover is deemed to capture job-to-job shifts and flows from unemployment to 
employment associated to the reshuffling of workers across a given set of jobs. 1
1 The author wishes to thank John Haltiwanger for useful comments on an initial draft. 




























































































However, job and labour turnover statistics typically originate from much 
different (and hardly comparable) data sources. Moreover, there is evidence that 
a significant component of job turnover is associated with temporary and 
mean-reverting changes in the size of business units. In other words, job turnover 
also captures many transient establishment-level employment variations most 
likely occurring as a result of voluntary separations and associated vacancy chains. 
Hence, even if job turnover was found to behave countercyclically, this finding 
could hardly be used to make inferences on the cyclical properties of worker flows 
associated (or complementary) to job turnover. Fortunately, new data sources are 
being developed which will provide information on both job and worker flows. 
Until such data become available, it may preferable not to overstate the heuristic 
content of job turnover statistics in the understanding of the time profile and 
cyclical properties of gross worker flows.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 1 reviews the theoretical literature 
on countercyclical job turnover. Section 2 provides an assessment of available 
data on job turnover in the various countries. Section 3 presents evidence on the 
behaviour of job turnover rates over the cycle. Sections 4 and 5 provide some 
possible explanations for the observation of countercyclical job turnover in the US 
and procyclical or acyclical in the other countries. Finally, Section 6 highlights 
other rather puzzling characteristics of job turnover —whose explanation could 
considerably improve our understanding of the job generation process— that have 
received so far little, if any, attention by theoreticians.
1. The models....
We have counted at least five models developed in the most recent years in 
an attempt to explain countercyclical movements of job turnover.
In the model developed by Davis and Haltiwanger (1990) job creation is 
time-consuming while job destruction is not. Fixed time-costs of moving from 
one job to another and/or making the new job operational2 smooth out the response 
of job creation to contemporaneous shocks. As a result, job destruction fluctuates 
more over the cycle than job creation. Because of these "reallocation-timing" 
effects, cyclical upturns involve more falls in job destruction than increases in job 
creation (hence reductions in job turnover), while downturns involve a rise in job 
destruction and only a moderate fall in job destruction (hence larger gross job 
reallocation).
2 As suggested by Davis and Haltiwanger (1990), a rationale for these fixed time effects 
is the time spent either while moving between two different production sites or while opening 
a new plant, and/or investing in match-specific capital.



























































































The model developed by Caballero and Hammour (1992) draws on an initial 
intuition by Blanchard and Diamond (1989): recessions are times of "cleansing" 
where creative destruction processes occur. Downturns cannot be accommodated 
mainly by changes in the pace at which new jobs are created -a s  opposed to changes 
in the magnitude of job destruction— because fast creation of jobs in an industry3 
is costly due possibly to congestion effects in the industry’s labour market. 
Alternatively, job creation only partly "insulates" job destruction -that is, declines 
in demand are only partly accommodated via reductions in job creation rates rather 
than larger job destruction rates- during downturns because the opportunity cost 
of starting-up a new enterprise is lower during downturns than in periods of 
economic recovery [Blanchard and Diamond, 1990], In both cases there is more 
time variation on job destruction than in job creation, and gross and net job changes 
are negatively correlated.
In both Davis and Haltiwanger’s and Caballero and Hammour’s models, 
countercyclical movements of job turnover are ultimately a byproduct of costs in 
creating new jobs while job destruction is costlessy and instantaneous. Another 
rationale for the posited asymmetry between gross job creation and destruction is 
in the costs associated with the filling of vacancies. In other words, job creation 
is time-consuming because it takes time to establish a match with some positive 
surplus. This is the route pursued by Mortensen and Pissarides4 (1994): in their 
job-search model, countercyclical movements of job turnover are originated by 
the time required to fill vacancies opened during upturns. During downturns, jobs 
are destroyed and vacancies are cancelled immediately. These asymmetries are 
even stronger when cyclical shocks are anticipated by firms and workers and when 
cyclical shocks have a low degree of persistence.
Mortensen and Pissarides’ model draws ultimately on the distinction between 
posting a vacancy and creating a job. Cyclical upturns affect immediately unfilled 
jobs, but have little immediate effect on actual job creation. Hence, job turnover 
is countercyclical. Similar is the approach followed by Burda and Wyplosz (1994) 
who distinguish between vacancies associated to unfilled jobs and vacancies 
associated to the creation of new positions. In Burda and Wyplosz’s model, the 
size of the shock hitting firms during recessions is crucial. For low values of the 
shock, firms can simply cancel planned positions or close unfilled vacancies, rather 
than dismissing workers. For high values of the shock, the opportunity cost of 
dismissing workers is lower than the cost of keeping vacancies unfilled, hence 
layoffs become the dominant form of employment adjustment. Large number of
3 Plant-level adjustment costs per se would not necessarily smooth job creation at the 
aggregate level. As shown in Caballero (1992), micro-level asymmetries do not necessarily 
carry-over to macro data.
4 Pissarides and Mortensen are more cautious than other authors in presenting empirical 
evidence on countercyclical movements of job turnover. In fact, they claim that "empirical 




























































































workers released during recessions in turn increase the number of "good" workers 
in the unemployment pool, stimulating the filling of other vacancies, thereby 
contributing to reduce the negative impact of recessions on gross job creation.
Finally, Burgess (1991) and Blanchflower and Burgess (1993) extend 
traditional search-theoretic models by allowing for job search by the employed. 
Countercyclical job reallocation and procyclical labour turnover are in this context 
accommodated by large and strongly pro-cyclical job-to-job shifts.
2. ...the data
Most data on job turnover used in empirical work come from administrative 
sources. In general, social security and unemployment insurance records (as in 
the case of France, Germany and Italy) or tax forms filled in by employers (as in 
the case of Canada, Denmark, Norway and Sweden) provide information on the 
number of full-time employees in individual business units at annual frequencies. 
This makes it possible to measure job turnover as a sum of establishment-level 
employment changes. It should be stressed that jobs are, in this context, filled 
positions. Ceteris paribus, if an individual leaves an establishment and, at the time 
of the statistical recording, has not yet been replaced, this unfilled job will be 
counted as a job loss. In other words, empirical measures of job turnover tend to 
overstate the actual turnover of posts, whether filled or unfilled. Conversely, job 
turnover is likely to seriously understate labour turnover, that is, the sum of gross 
hirings and separations over business units. As individual posts within an estab­
lishment cannot be identified by data, hires and separations are in fact not counted 
which net out at the level of an individual business unit.
The above holds also for data on job turnover collected on the basis of 
establishment surveys (as in the case of the LRD data used in most studies on the 
US). An advantage of survey data with respect to information drawn from 
administrative sources is that they may be available at higher (e.g., quarterly) 
frequencies and that their coverage tends not to be affected by changes in regu­
lations. By the same token, they seem to provide a better basis for international 
comparisons insofar as differences in the coverage of social security schemes or 
in the degree of misreporting of tax information should not affect survey data. 
However, unlike most administrative data, business surveys usually involve only 
enterprises above a given threshold5 and the survey panel is usually renewed only 
at discrete intervals, which reduces the representativity of the sample the further 
from the rotation date and makes it more problematic the measurement of entry
5 The high costs of surveys often suggest introducing relatively large thresholds in the 
size of business units that end-up reducing dramatically the sampling frame. Small units are 




























































































and exit6. In the case of the LRD data, for instance, only enterprises with more 
than five employees are surveyed, which leaves aside a large component of job 
turnover, namely job turnover originated by entry and exit of firms or establish­
ments in the fringe.
The statistical unit varies across countries as well as recording and de-re­
cording procedures. In Germany, for instance, the unit is the establishment or the 
plant, identifiers do not change in the case of mergers or acquisitions, and hence 
only' 'true'' births or deaths are counted. By contrast, in Sweden not only ownership 
changes, but also changes in the staff of any individual plant involve the attribution 
of a new ID number. In other countries, such as Canada and the US, it is possible 
to have information on both plant openings and closures and ownership changes 
for continuing establishments as different identifiers are assigned for the ownership 
and location of plants.
Given these differences in units of measurement and coverage of national 
series, cross-country comparisons may not be particularly meaningful7. For this 
reason, in the remainder, we will confine ourselves to analysing the time-series 
properties of job turnover in each country.
3. ..and the facts
Table 1 displays correlation coefficients between job turnover and aggregate 
employment growth for all countries in which data on gross job flows were 
available for sufficiently long a time period to make this analysis meaningful8. As 
shown in Chart 1, all countries selected have experienced both expansionary 
periods and cyclical downturns during the observation period.
Job turnover is in Table 1 defined as follows:
6 In fact, there is a high risk of mistakenly imputing to entry and exit the rotations of the
panel.
7 See, however, OECD (1987) and OECD (1994) for comparisons of job turnover rates 
across countries. See also Blanchflower (1994) and Grey (1993) for a discussion of cross-country 
comparability issues.
8 Data were collected by OECD aggregated by industry and, limited to some countries, 
by establishment size classes. See the Annex for details on the national data sources and OECD 
(1994) for a cross-industry analysis of job turnover rates.




























































































The Time-Series Relation between Net and Gross Job Flows
(Rank correlation coefficients(l), yearly data)

























Sources: See the annex.
Notes:
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where xu denotes the number of employees of any establishment i at time t. Thus 
employees in exiting units are counted in the denominator of ( 1 ) whilst employees



























































































in units created between t-1 and t are included in the numerator9. Net employment 
growth (NET) is given by:
X 1)
NETt(E) = ——=----------  (2)
JL xit _ i
i eE
Strikingly enough, in all countries, except the US, the correlation coefficient 
between gross and net job flows is either positive or statistically insignificant10. 
In other words, there is no evidence of countercyclical movements of job turnover, 
at least outside the US. In the latter case the correlation between JT and NET is 
negative and significant at 90 per cent confidence levels, as reported in previous 
studies by Davis and Haitiwanger (1990 and 1992). The US is also one of the 
countries with the lowest magnitude and largest time-series variation of job 
reallocation rates (second and third columns of Table 1), but comparisons of this 
kind are problematic given the data issues discussed above and the fact that 
available data cover different time-periods and cyclical conditions in the various 
countries.
4. Why is the US so Different?
A possible explanation for the observed asymmetries in the cyclical behaviour 
of JT between the US and the other countries could rely in institutional differences 
between North-American and Western European labour markets. In particular, 
the greater flexibility of the US and Canadian labour markets is often stressed, in 
contrast with tight dismissal regulations prevailing in most European labour 
markets. The costs incurred by employers in laying-off workers may smooth over 
time the accelerations in gross job destruction occurring during downturns, thereby 
reducing the correlation between JT and NET. Hence, a lower degree of
9 An alternative weighting of gross job flows was suggested by Davis and Haltiwanger 
(1990) which uses as denominator in (1) the average between employment in the base and in 
the final year, and hence bounds growth rates of exiting units and entrants between -2 and 2. 
This alternative (perhaps less intuitive) measure of job turnover would not affect our results. 
Entry and exit processes seem in fact to play a minor role in the cyclical behaviour of JT and 
NET (Boeri and Cramer, 1992; OECD, 1994).
10 Spearman rank correlation coefficients are reported in the table rather than simple 
correlations insofar as limitations in the coverage of job turnover series would suggest not having 
too much confidence in the scale of the two covariates. In any event, results obtained while 
computing Pearson correlation coefficients were not different; the US was also in this case the 
only country in which we observed a statistically significant and negative correlation between 
JT and NET.



























































































responsiveness of gross job destruction to cyclical conditions should be observed 
in heavily regulated European labour markets compared to the US and Canadian
case11.
The simple model developed in Annex 2 helps characterising the effects of 
employment security (ES) schemes on gross job flows. It suggests, first of all, 
that higher firing costs tend to reduce aggregate job flows. This is at odds with 
table 1, which points to relatively high job turnover rates in highly regulated labour 
markets like Italy and France and low JT in "flexible" labour markets like the US. 
A second implication of the model is that the tightening of ES schemes increases 
the cyclical responsiveness of gross job creation (POS) relative to job destruction 
(NEG), thereby contributing to partly "insulate" NEG from aggregate shocks. 
Finally, the model suggests that also net employment flows become less responsive 
to aggregate shocks as a result of tight dismissal regulations.
Table 2 reports results obtained by pooling time-series and cross-section 
observations and regressing net and gross job flows against the rate of growth of 
GDP in three different groups of countries capturing the institutional differences 
outlined above. In particular, group 1 includes the two North-American labour 
markets in our database (US and Canada), group 2 denotes the Nordic countries, 
namely Denmark, Norway and Sweden, whilst group 3 is composed of France, 
Germany and Italy. These three regional groupings roughly correspond to different 
degrees of tightness of employment security regulations. Several rankings of 
countries based on the "strictness" of employment protection schemes have been 
defined in recent years1 2, in which the US and Canada typically feature among the 
countries with fairly extensive freedom to dismiss, the Nordics occupy inter­
mediate positions being generally more restrictive in notice and severance pay 
regulations than in procedural obstacles to the implementation of no-fault 
dismissals, while Germany, France and Italy are generally considered as having 
"fundamental" employment protection constraints in all domains13.
Given the large differences in the magnitude of JT in the various countries 
documented above (which do not seem to be associated to varying degrees of ES 
and can be attributed to the different coverage of job turnover statistics in the 
various countries, as discussed in the previous section) we preferred to focus on 
the time-series association between job flows and GDP growth only. Thus, we 
display within-groups estimators only. Under this specification, country-specific 
fixed effects are allowed for, but common slope coefficients are imposed across
11 See Baldwin, Dunne and Haltiwanger (1992) for a comparison of US and Canadian 
job reallocation rates. Consistently with our findings, the authors did not observe countercyclical 
movements of job turnover in Canada.
12 See OECD (1994), Bertola (1990), IOE (1988) and Grubb and Wells (1993).




























































































the various countries. Hence, we allowed for varying regional elasticities of job 
flows to GDP growth and tested the homogeneity of the coefficients across the 
three regional groups described above.
Table 2
Employment Security Schemes and the Cyclical Properties of Job Turn­
over
(within-groups regression results)
Dependent variable nobs GDP GDP2(1) GDP3(2) Wald Wald R(3)
NET 80 1.20 -.24 -.28 1536** 2.64
(38.77)** (.69) (1.48) (3) (2)
POS 80 .52 .08 .00 573** .41
(23.10)** (.13) (.00) (3) (2)
NEG 80 -.67 .30 .28 174** 6.41*
(12.56)** (1.36) (2.26) (3) (2)
Notes: Robust t-statistics and degrees of freedom (for Wald tests) are displayed in parentheses. 
One asterisk denotes significance at 95, two asterisks at 99.
(1) GDP coefficient (expressed in terms of deviation from the slope coefficient for the US 
and Canada) for the group of Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway and Sweden).
(2) GDP coefficient (expressed in terms of deviation from the slope coefficient for the US 
and Canada) for the group of Central European countries (Germany, France and Italy)
(3) Wald test of joint significance of the two region-specific coefficients.
Sources: See the Annex.
The sign of the coefficients is in line with a-priori expectations: NET and 
gross job creation increase during upturns whilst gross job destruction moves 
countercyclically. However, we found little support to the hypothesis that ES 
regulations affect the cyclical responsiveness of gross job flows. Country-specific 
slope coefficients are, in fact, not significant, except in the case of the elasticity 
of gross job destruction which appears to be significantly lower in Germany, France 
and Italy than in the US and Canada. Similar results were obtained by running the 
model against lagged GDP growth14.
14 Given the low numbers of observations available in each country it was not possible 
to run regressions including both simultaneous and lagged GDP growth.



























































































Although longer time-series would be required to better assess the effects of 
employment protection schemes on the cyclical properties of job turnover15, the 
above does not lend support to the view that asymmetries in the cyclical behaviour 
of JT in the US compared with the other countries can be attributed to institutional 
differences among the various labour markets. Employment security schemes are 
often difficult to enforce, and there are many ways employers can reduce the 
workforce while avoiding procedural complications and dismissal costs. For 
instance, there is ample evidence suggesting that employers react to tight 
employment security schemes by inducing a larger number of workers to quit 
[Burgess and Nickell, 1989]. Furthermore, employment security schemes may be 
a source of fixed or "lumpy" adjustment costs which result in much different a 
time profile (and one generally increasing, rather than reducing the time variation 
of NEG) for layoff policies of firms than in the standard case of quadratic 
adjustment costs (Hamermesh, 1993).
The degree of unionisation of the workforce may be more relevant than 
employment security regulations in accounting for observed asymmetries in the 
cyclical behaviour of JT. However, there is no evidence that the degree of uni­
onisation of the workforce can explain the wide cross-industry variation in job 
turnover rates observed in countries like the US [Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh, 
1994] and highly unionised countries, like the Nordics, tend to display the largest 
job reallocation rates (Table 1).
5. Cyclical Properties of JT and Regression to the Mean Fallacies
Data issues are another obvious candidate for explaining the differences 
between the US and the other countries reported in Table 1, and hence we turn 
next to these issues.
US data on job turnover differ from those of the other countries in at least 
three important respects. First, while data on Canada, Denmark, France, western 
Germany, Italy, Sweden and Norway come from administrative sources, US data 
are drawn from a sub-sample of the Annual Survey of Manufacturing (see the 
Annex for details on national sources). Secondly, US data refer only to the 
manufacturing sector whilst elsewhere they tend to cover not only manufacturing,
15 Longer time-series would also permit to characterise patterns of autocorrelations in job 
creation and destruction, and hence better assess the degree of "smoothing" of job destmction 
associated with tight employment security schemes. First order autocorrelations in job 
destruction computed on the basis of available data are positive and significant in the case of 
Canada, Denmark and Germany and are insignificant elsewhere. Explanations of asymmetries 
in the cyclical behaviour of job turnover based on the degree of tightness of employment pro­
tection schemes would suggest that the autocorrelation should be stronger in the countries with 
the highest levels of protection (e.g., Italy and France). But the limited number of observations 
available place serious constraints on the interpretation of these results.



























































































but also services16. Thirdly, US data cover only establishments with more than 5 
employees and as the sampling frame is renewed only at Census years frequencies, 
there is also a high risk of undersampling small units above that threshold the 
further away from the last Census and the stronger the growth of the small business 
sector between any two Census years17. And there is no indications of 
countercyclical movements of job turnover when other job flow data for the US 
are used, which offer a better coverage of the small business sector. For instance, 
the correlation coefficient between JT and NET computed on the basis of USEEM 
data18 referred to the period 1976-91 was - .2 which is not significant at conventional 
levels.
Sample selection against small units (if not the underreporting of small 
business) may contribute to explaining differences in cyclical properties of job 
turnover between the US and the other countries. In fact, the exclusion of the 
smallest units seriously biases job turnover data against gross job creation. 
Although plants with less than five employees generally account for no more than 
5 per cent of total employment, they generate a very large component of total gross 
job flows19. As vividly documented by all the most recent empirical literature on 
the relation between growth and size of firms20, net job creation is highly con­
centrated among small and young business units whereas gross job destruction 
usually exceeds gross job creation when the focus is on the largest business units21.
16 Data on Norway do not cover services, but only industry, that is manufacturing plus 
mining and quarrying. As discussed below, this may contribute to explaining the negative 
(although not statistically significant) correlation coefficient for this country.
17 Data from the US Small Business Administration commented in OECD (1994) suggest 
that the employment share in establishments with less than 20 employees would have indeed 
increased considerably at the turn of the eighties.
18 In the US Establishment and Employment Microdata (USEEM) the average size of 
plants is 17.7 compared with 80 in the LRD sample used by Davis and Haltiwanger. The USEEM 
panel -like  most administrative data sources— covers all establishments with at least one 
employee, but requires also that units have a Dun & Bradstreet credit rating for inclusion in the 
dataset. Unfortunately, we had no access to USEEM JT data by establishment size classes, 
which would have also been useful to assess the role played by sample selection in the asym­
metries between LRD and USEEM data.
19 In western Germany, for instance, gross job flows generated by plants with less than 
5 employees accounted for more than 50 per cent of total job turnover in the period covered by 
data [Boeri, 1994]. Similarly, in Denmark, Italy and Sweden, plants with less than 20 employees 
accounted for between 55 and 66 per cent of total gross job creations [OECD, 1994].
20 As shown in Boeri (1989), all the most recent literature on the testing of Gibrat’s Law 
rejected the presence of proportionate effects in firms’ growth unlike the studies carried out in 
the 1960s and 1970s. A possible explanation for these conflicting results is in the little coverage 
provided by earlier studies of the small business sector. A strong negative relationship between 
size and growth has been observed especially in the case of the smallest units.
21 In Canada, Denmark and Sweden, net job creation among units with less than 20 
employees was, in the period covered by data, above 2 per cent, compared with -.3 to -.6 per 
cent net employment declines in units with more than 500 employees [OECD, 1994].



























































































Similarly, focussing only on manufacturing units means understating 
economy-wide gross job creation relative to gross job destruction insofar as in all 
countries the employment share of manufacturing has been steadily declining in 
the period covered by data.
Summarising, sample selection against small units or the service sector tends 
to reduce the magnitude, hence the variance, of job creation relative to job 
destruction rates. By reducing the time-series variation of gross job creation 
relative to gross job destruction, the neglect of small units may bias downwards 
correlation coefficients between job turnover and net employment growth22.
Table 3
Time-Series Variation of Gross Job Creation and Destruction
Country Var(POS) Var(NEG) CV(POS) CV(NEG)
Canada 5.35 8.19 .15 .22
Denmark .50 .54 .08 .08
France 2.84 .80 .14 .07
Germany .72 .71 .10 .11
Italy 1.42 .74 .10 .08
Norway (1) 1.29 1.82 .16 .17
Sweden 3.99 2.23 .14 .10
US(1) 4.08 8.96 .22 .29
Sources: See the annex.
Notes:
POS and NEG as defined in the text.
CV stands for the coefficient of variation. 
(1) Manufacturing only.
22 Denoting by POS gross job creation (the sum of establishment-level employment 
changes among expanding units and new entrants) and by NEG gross job destruction (the sum 
of establishment-level employment changes among declining and exiting units), we have that:
Cov(JT,NET) = Var(POS)~ Var(NEG)
because JT = POS +NEG whereas NET = POS -NEG . Denote then the true values of POS 
and NEG by an asterisk and suppose that the measured job creation and destruction rates are a 
constant fraction of the true values, i.e., that:
POS = \iPOS* NEG = yNEG * l > y > p > 0
where we have taken into account the fact that small units contribute more to gross job creation 
than to gross job destruction. It then follows that:



























































































Table 3 collects available evidence on the time-series variation of gross job 
creation (POS) and destruction (NEG) rates. By comparing variances (first and 
second column) with the coefficients of variation (third and fourth column) it is 
possible to grasp the role played by scale effects in increasing the variance of NEG 
relative to POS and hence in altering the cyclical properties of job turnover. In 
Norway, for instance, the variance of NEG is larger than the variance of POS, and 
therefore the covariance between JT and NET is negative. However, when the 
two measures of dispersion are properly standardised (third and fourth columns), 
it turns out that POS varies more over time than NEG. Similarly, in the US the 
variance of job destruction is much larger than the variance of job creation, whilst 
differences in the coefficients of variation of POS and NEG are of a second order 
magnitude. The case of Italy is symmetric: here scale effects tend to magnify the 
time variation of POS relative to NEG, thereby inducing a positive correlation 
between JT and NET.
The role played by sample selection in the correlation between net and gross 
job flows can also be assessed by comparing correlation coefficients between JT 
and NET for small and large units and for plants in industry and services. Limited 
to three countries representative of the broad regional groupings outlined above 
—Canada, Germany and Denmark— we had indeed access to data on job turnover 
by sector and by size of establishments.
Table 4 displays correlation coefficients between JT and NET for different 
sectors and for the smallest (less than 20 employees) and largest (more than 500 
employees) establishments in Canada, Germany and Denmark. Strikingly enough, 
small units seem to exhibit some procyclical pattern (especially in the case of 
Canada), whilst large units display negative correlation coefficients23. A negative 
correlation between JT and NET is also observed in manufacturing, but the 
coefficients are not statistically significant. Job turnover in services would seem 
to be in all countries either acyclical or mildly procyclical. It is difficult to dis­
entangle firm-size from industry effects on the cyclical properties of job turnover. 
Insofar as most small business units belong to the service sector, the different 
cyclical properties of job turnover in services and manufacturing may indeed be 
merely a byproduct of firm-size effects. In any event, whether due to regression
23 Consistently with our findings, Violante and Prat (1992) report positive correlation 
coefficients for small units and negative for large firms in Italy. Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh 
also found that even in US manufacturing job turnover in small, younger, less specialised and 
lower-wage plants does not behave countercyclically. Insofar as young and highly specialised 
plants are smaller than the average and that there is a strong positive correlation between firm 
size and wages, this finding may also point to firm-size (regression to the mean) effects. Konings 
(1993) computed correlation coefficients between job turnover and net employment change for 
a sample of large UK firms (averaging about 4,000 employees) observing a negative correlation 
between JT and NET like that observed in Canada, Germany and Denmark for the largest plants. 
Finally, Broersma and Gautier (1995) display positive correlations between JT and NET for 
plants with less than 100 employees and negative for the largest units in the Netherlands in the 
period 1979-91.





























































































































Sources: See the Annex.
Notes: Spearman rank-correlation coefficients; marginal significance levels in 
parentheses.
(1) Establishments with less than 20 employees.
(2) Establishments with more than 500 employees.
to the mean24 of the largest units or to the declining trend of employment in 
manufacturing, the posited countercyclical properties of job turnover look very 
much like an unsurprising statistical artifact.
6. Job and Worker Flows
The above suggests that, in spite of the several models produced in recent 
years to account for counter-cyclical movements of job turnover, evidence on the 
cyclical properties of gross job reallocation is far from conclusive. Only gross job 
flows originated by changes in the size of the largest establishments or firms would 
appear to behave countercyclically in all countries, but this is likely to reflect a 
mean-reverting process in growth —the fact that the largest units have a higher 
probability than smaller units to decline- rather than important asymmetries 
between gross job creation and destruction like those framed by the theoretical 
literature. Moreover, these "countercyclical" components of job turnover account
24 Plants that are large in one year are more likely than small units to have experienced 
a shock that pushed them to expand capacity and that will be reverted next year. Similarly, 
small plants are more likely than large units to have recently experienced a transient negative 
shock.



























































































only for a very minor component of total gross job flows. To give an example, in 
Germany the largest establishments (those with more than 500 employees) 
accounted over the 1980s for 30 per cent of total employment, but for only about 
5 per cent of total of job turnover [Boeri, 1994]. Hence, to the extent that some 
components of job turnover appear to be negatively correlated with employment 
growth, they represent only a very minor segment of total gross job flows.
In addition to providing material for model-builders, the cyclical properties 
of job turnover have also been used to make inference on the behaviour over the 
cycle of labour market flows on which little, if any, information is generally 
available. A typical example is that of job-to-job shifts. As stressed by Davis, 
Haltiwanger and Schuh (1994), procyclical labour turnover together with 
countercyclical job turnover implies that the component of labour turnover which 
is not associated to job turnover, being mainly the result of the reshuffling of 
workers across a given set of jobs, is procyclical.
The "stylized fact" challenged in this paper has also been used to draw 
conclusions on the main factors lying behind the time-series variation of unem­
ployment inflows and outflows25. Evidence from various countries suggests that 
unemployment flows move countercyclically and that flows to and from out-of-the 
labour force display little cyclical variation. In other words, the pace of flows 
between employment and unemployment (the so-called E-U flows) would seem 
to drive the behaviour of unemployment inflows and outflows over the cycle. 
Against this background, countercyclical job turnover (together with procyclical 
labour turnover) would seem to imply that the time-series variation of unem­
ployment inflows and outflows is mainly associated with changes in the pace of 
gross job creation and destruction rather than with changes in the intensity of 
worker reallocations across a given set of jobs.
There are, in our view, a number of problems with this use of job turnover 
data in arguing about the cyclical properties of unobserved worker flows. The 
first problem is that job turnover and labour turnover (LT henceforth) statistics are 
not comparable as they generally come from different sources and use different 
units and methods of measurement. Job turnover counts jobs, while the statistical 
units of labour turnover are the individuals. Job turnover is a discrete time measure, 
while labour turnover is not. Job turnover is, in fact, measured by taking 
first-differences of employment stocks, while labour turnover records all hirings 
and separations occurred within a given time-period. Finally, available data on 
job turnover do not allow to distinguish individual jobs within establishments. 
Hence, changes in the characteristics of jobs offered by any establishments are not 
recorded when these do not involve changes in the size of business units.
25 See Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1994), Chapter V and Burda and Wyplosz (1994).



























































































All this suggests that there is little we can learn while comparing available 
labour and job turnover measures. Job turnover can, at best, provide an upper 
bound (because some workers can move directly from shrinking to expanding 
units, in which case their change of jobs would be counted twice by job turnover 
statistics) for the number of worker reallocations involved by measured changes 
in the distribution of jobs across business units. And labour turnover can be at 
best considered an upper bound for the amount of worker reallocations involved 
by registered hirings and separations insofar as LT, like JT, double-counts 
job-to-job shifts. The difference between LT and JT is therefore some combination 
of job-to-job shifts and shifts of workers across establishments that have not altered 
the size of their workforce from one observation date to another, rather than simply 
a measure of job-to-job shifts. And this difference is quite large. The few studies 
presenting JT and LT statistics coming from the same source26 show that JT is 
between one-third and one-half of LT.
Job turnover would be a less ambiguous concept for the purpose of worker 
flows analysis if it captured alterations in the allocation of employment across 
business units having a strong degree of persistence. In the latter case, JT could 
be considered as a measure worker reallocations induced by changes in the dis­
tribution of employment opportunities, rather than by (supposedly voluntary) shifts 
of workers across a given set of jobs. In other words, job turnover could be 
considered as essentially a labour demand concept capturing shifts in the allocation 
of employment opportunities rather than voluntary decisions of workers to move 
from one job to another or to leave and enter the world of work. The issue is that 
both gross job creation and destruction seem to have a large transient component. 
Davis and Haltiwanger, for instance, show that in the US only about 40 per cent 
of jobs created in one quarter are still in existence three quarters later and almost 
half of the jobs destroyed in a quarter are regained three quarters later27. Moreover, 
evidence on patterns of autocorrelation of growth rates of individual business units 
point to forms of overshooting in employment levels: first-order correlations are 
negative while growth rates are not correlated more than one year apart [Leonard, 
1988; Boeri and Cramer, 1992]. One year of growth tends to be followed by one 
year of decline in the number of jobs in any establishment. Conversely, if an 
establishment shrinks, it probably grew in the recent past. The presence of a large 
transient component in JT may suggest that voluntary quits and other supply-driven 
forms of worker reallocation are an important determinant of changes in the size 
of business units rather than the other way round, e.g., recorded job losses in 
individual establishments may simply reflect unfilled vacancies after the departure 
of the former post-holder, rather than actual cancellations of positions.
26 See Boeri (1994) for JT and LT data on western Germany, Cassidi, Dell’Aringa and 
Lucifora (1994) for evidence on Italy, Anderson and Meyer (1994) for comparisons of job and 
worker turnover rates in the US and Hamermesh, Hassink and van Ours for data on the 
Netherlands.
27 See Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), ibidem.



























































































Directions for Further Research
In conclusion, there is little loss in not being able of identifying clearcut 
cyclical properties of job turnover because inferences on labour flows based on 
available measures of job turnover are, in any event, questionable.
Fortunately, new datasets are currently being developed in many countries 
that not only allow for tracking over time establishment-level employment 
changes, but also permit to identify individual workers within each plant. Such 
datasets have been used so far mainly to disentangle firm and individual char­
acteristics in the estimation of earning functions [Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis, 
1994] and to investigate the effects of technologies on the earnings and educational 
attainments of the workforce [Doms, Dunne and Trotske, 1994]. The potential of 
these datasets in generating a new wave of empirical research on asymmetries in 
the cyclical behaviour of job versus worker flows is still largely unexploited. 
Among the issues which could be possibly addressed drawing on data linking both 
individuals and establishments: is the time-variation in job destruction dominated 
by the dynamics of quits or involuntary separations? Do changes over time in job 
creation rates predominantly reflect changes in the magnitude of job-to-job shifts 
or other labour market flows?
While available measures of job turnover are not suitable to disentangle the 
various sources of labour turnover, they are very valuable in analysing the dis­
tribution of employment changes. Job turnover is essentially a measure of the 
dispersion of establishment level growth-rates1. Job turnover rates of the order of 
20-30 per cent are an indication that establishment level outcomes are highly 
heterogeneous. Furthermore, a large dispersion of establishment growth rates 
seems to persist even when the focus in on specific sectors or industries. A common 
finding of empirical research on job turnover is that the variance of 
establishment-level employment changes within any industry is by and large the 
main component of job turnover [Boeri, 1994; Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992; 
Konings, 1993; Leonard, 1988; Violante and Prat, 1992], Insofar as this hetero­
geneity plays an important role in the time variation of gross job flows [Davis and 
Haltiwanger, 1990; Boeri and Cramer, 1992], the identification of the main sources 
of this heterogeneity can also shed some light on the determinants of aggregate 
outcomes.
1 As shown in Boeri (1994), for all establishments having some positive employment at 
t, job turnover can also be rewritten as:
Tr, = I l g „ Kf
where g, and s„ denote, respectively, the (employment) growth rate and the (employment) share 
of establishment i. In other words, job turnover can also be interpreted as a weighted (by the 
respective employment share) sum of deviations of establishment growth rates from zero.



























































































Regrettably, little attention has been devoted so far by theoretical work to 
providing explanations for this tremendous heterogeneity of establishment level 
employment dynamics. Understanding the sources of this heterogeneity remains 
therefore a main challenge for further work exploiting the rich data sources 
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Annex 1 — Data Sources
Canada
Data come from the Small Business database maintained by Statistics Canada 
based on administrative data (tax form fdled annually by employers) providing 
information on the total wage bill of private enterprises (excluding the self-em­
ployed). Estimates of employment in each unit are obtained by dividing data on 
the wage bill in each enterprise by annual average earnings per employee of the 
same industry and province, the latter data drawn from Canada’s monthly estab­
lishment survey. Clearly, these employment estimates may seriously underesti­
mate the actual number of workers in all sectors where part-time employment is 
especially relevant.
Other limitations of data concern the treatment of plants that have been closed 
down in the course of the year. By measuring employment in these enterprises in 
terms of full-year equivalent person-years, the risk is to seriously undersetimate 
employment in closing units as the wage bill may refer only to part of the year.
Denmark
Data are collected by the Danish Statistical Office (Danmarks Statistiks) on 
the basis of various administrative sources (tax forms, unemployment register data 
and population registers). Insofar as identifiers are provided for both business 
units and workers, it is possible, in principle (this information was not available 
to the author) to analyse not only job turnover, but also labour turnover.
As individual jobs within any plant can be identified, establishments can be 
discriminated not only on the basis of their physical location or ownership, but 
also based on their workforce, which allows for a better identification of true 
"births" and "deaths". In particular, establishment identifiers would not change 
even when the plant has changed owner and location, but at least 30 per cent of 
the workforce is still employed.
France
Data are drawn from the Unemployment Insurance records of the "Union 
pour l ’Emploi dans l’lndustrie et le Commerce" (UNEDIC) where all private 
employers with at least one dependent employee are compelled to register. 
Individual establishments (not firms!) are assigned identification numbers which 
makes it possible to follow plant-level employment histories over time.



























































































UNEDIC data seem to cover about 70 per cent of total dependent employment 
in France the remaining 30% consisting of civil servants and self-employed. The 
coverage of UNEDIC data is particularly high in manufacturing and in traded 
services.
Germany
Data are drawn from the Employment Statistics register of the Federal Office 
of Labour (Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit), and collected via the Social Insurance 
procedure introduced in 1973 that compels employers to report every year all 
changes occurred in the number of workers who are subject to a health or unem­
ployment insurance or who are participating in a pension scheme. There are legal 
sanctions for misreporting.
As shown by comparisons with Microzensus data, the register covers all 
employees in the private sector, i.e., almost 80 per cent of total employment in 
Germany, the remaining 20% consisting of civil servants and self-employed. 
Individual plants are assigned separate identification numbers even when they 
belong to the same firm: this makes it possible to trace individual histories of about 
2.7 million establishments which have been operating between 1977 and 1990.
Italy
Data are drawn from records of social security contributions collected by 
INPS (Instituto Nazionale Previdenza Sociale). Each private enterprise with more 
than one employee is compelled to declare the total number of dependent workers 
and the total wage bill. There are legal sanctions for misreporting.
Each employer is assigned by INPS an identification number. By exploiting 
these codes, a longitudinal data base has been developed which allows to trace 
individual histories in principle of all private enterprises operating in manufac­
turing and services (separate records are kept for agricultural workers) and with 
at least one dependent employee.
Norway
Data are drawn from the Central Register of Establishments and Enterprises 
maintained by the Central Bureau of Statistics (Statistisk Sentralbyra) on the basis 
of tax forms and social security records. The statistical unit is the establishment 
or physical plant, as opposed to the firm. Data on average yearly (rather than on 
end-of-the year stocks) dependent employment in each unit is provided.
Data used in this study concern only manufacturing, mining and quarrying.




























































































As in the case of Norway, data are drawn from the Business Register main­
tained by Statistics Sweden on the basis of information provided by administrative 
records (social security records and tax forms). Individual identifiers are provided 
for both the establishment and the firm. For each unit information is available on 
the total number of dependent employees.
Data cover private employment in all industries excluding agriculture, for­
estry and fishing.
US
Data are drawn from the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) maintained 
by the Center for Economic Studies at the U.S. Bureau of the Census. The LRD 
links over time observations on a sub-sample of the Annual Survey of Manufac­
turing (ASM). The panel on which the ASM is based is changed two years after 
each Census year as the latter is used as sampling frame. Each year, however, new 
establishments are added to the panel to preserve its representative character.
LRD data encompasses US manufacturing establishments with more than 5 
employees. Moreover, while all establishments with more than 250 employees 
are included in the ASM sample, smaller establishments are sampled with prob­
abilities proportional to a measure of size determined for each establishment from 
the previous Census.



























































































Annex 2 — A Simple Model o f Job Turnover and Employment Security
Following Blanchard and Diamond (1989), we assume that each year a fraction 8 
of the total number of jobs becomes obsolete (e.g., because of the rate of obsolence 
of machines workers are matched to) and a fraction y of the total number of idle 
positions gets profitable. Workers on obsolete jobs cannot be immediately 
relocated to new posts, but have to experience an intervening unemployment spell. 
As we are interested in the cyclical properties of job creation and destruction, we 
focus on aggregate shocks' only. In particular, we assume that 8 and y are, 
respectively, non-increasing and non-decreasing functions of an aggregate (demand) 
shock, Y, i.e., that:
8 =g{Y) g'< 0 (D
and:
y=flY) / >  0
The aggregate shock evolves as a first-order (exogenous) Markov process 
satisfying:
ÒF/ÒY < 0 (3)
where F is the transition distribution function:
F(Y/Y)=Pr(Y<YIYt_1=Y)
that, is, aggregate shocks exhibit some degree of persistence, in the sense of first- 1
1 Allowing for idyosincratic shocks is a simple extension of this model insofar as aggregate 
and plant-specific shocks are not correlated.



























































































order stochastic dominance2. We are interested in analysing the effects of 
employment security regulations on job turnover. Hence, we will assume that 
employers can layoff workers with one period notice3 and incurring in (quadratic) 
adjustment cost:
Cf=feSj2 (5 )
where b is a parameter and S; denotes the total number of separations in the firm:
V ' C V (6)
where q stands for voluntary quits and I is an indicator function that takes the value 
1 when Xj is lower or equal than xM and 0 otherwise. Since our data mainly 
capture separations initiated by the employers, we will further assume — along with 
most of the job-matching literature -- that q, = 0 for all firms. Employers decide 
upon planned layoffs to be implemented next period after having observed this 
period Y. As shown by Hamennesh (1993), the expected profit maximisation 
problem of the firm leads to the dynamic labour demand equation:
■V*sa-i=A<P(1'’«-1)l*ir-1 lP/<0 <7)
where 0 < X < 1 is an implicit function decreasing in b and the latter inequality 
holds because of the property of the function g and of the stochastic process in Y. 
Aggregating over firms, we obtain then the overall job destruction rate: *
: Some persistence in shocks is required to ensure that firms reduce their workforce in 
response to negative shocks in presence of quadratic firing costs and compulsory advance 
notification of dismissals
’This corresponds to practice in most OECD countries where advance notification of 
dismissals is required. The implications of allowing for instantaneous dismissals are, however, 
discussed below.



























































































NEG,=X<p(K,_1) ( l - l / , _ 1) ( 8 )
The matching of jobseekers and vacancies is time-consuming and can be described 
by the aggregate matching function:
POSr M(Ut_vVt l ) Mu,Mvi  0 0 <9>
In order to close the model, we need to specify the law of motion of vacancies. 
As suggested by equation (2), new vacancies are posted at a rate y (non-decreasing 
in the aggregate shock) of the stock of unprofitable jobs (idle capacity). Vacancies 
posted at time t can then be filled next period via the matching technology outlined 
above, i.e.:
^Vl=nUt.r Vt-l)-M(Ul_l,Vl_l) (10)
As the labour force is fixed, the dynamics of unemployment is fully characterised 
by job creation and destruction rates, defined, respectively , by (8) and (9):
A l / . ^ t p d - l / , . , )  A f ( l / t l , l / _ , )  ( l l )
We consider first, the comparative statics effects of the tightening of employment 
security regulations at the steady state equilibrium. Chart 1 displays the vacancy 
(VV) and the Beveridge (UV) curves obtained, respectively, by equating (10) and 
(11) to zero. The UV curve slopes downwards4 5insofar as a rise in U (involving
4 Formally, by implicit function rule, the slope of the UV curve is given by:
8K  (*<P+Afu)
~bU ~Mv
which is negative insofar as the matching function is increasing in both its arguments and A and
5 are positive. The slope of the VV curve is given by:



























































































a decline in inflow rates per given realisations of the aggregate shock) has to be 
compensated by a decline in the number of posted vacancies in order to maintain 
unemployment at its long-run equilibrium. The VV curve is upward sloping 
because a rise in U involves an increase in the number of idle positions, and hence, 
for given realizations of the aggregate shock, larger vacancy inflows. This has to 
be compensated by an increase in the number of filled positions, and given the 
matching technology, by larger stocks of vacancies. The steady state equilibrium 
lying at the intersection of the two curves is globally stable.
The effects of reductions in X (induced by the tightening of employment security 
schemes) are also displayed in Chart 1. These involve a shift towards the origin 
of the UV curve whilst the VV curve is unaffected by the change. Thus, the new 
steady state equilibrium involves less unemployment and vacancies. By the job 
creation condition and the fact that at the equilibrium POS must equal NEG it then 
follows that the long-run job turnover rate (the sum of POS and NEG) must decline 
as a result o f the tightening o f employment security schemes.
Two further testable implications of the model can be established, in terms of the 
elasticities of POS and NEG with respect to the aggregate shock. By (8) we have 
that:
N £G j,i=X<p/( l- i /_ 1)sO (12)
which shows that a tightening o f employment security regulations reduces the 
responsiveness o f  job destruction to aggregate demand shocks. By (9) and (10), 
we also have that:
which is unambiguously positive. If we allow for instantaneous layoffs in response to aggregate 
shocks, the slope of the VV curve would be given by:
5 K Y~MU
6 U y +MV
which is positive insofar as y exceeds Mu over the relevant range. The case where VV slopes 
downwards or bends after reaching a critical unemployment level (with the consequent possibility 
o f multiple equilibria) is not discussed herein for simplicity. Note, however, that this case would 
not affect our results insofar as the "bad" equilibrium is located in a region where Mv exceeds Mu




























































































where Ov stand for the vacancy outflow rate and r|MV denotes the elasticity of job 
matching with respect to vacancies. Equation (13) is positive by (2). In the case 
where layoffs are instantaneous, the responsiveness of POS to cyclical fluctuations 
in demand would be given by:
where Ou stands for the outflow rate from unemployment and r|Ml, for the elasticity 
of job finds with respect to the unemployment stock. Equation (13') suggests that - 
- under instantaneous layoff policies of firms — the response of job creation to 
aggregate shocks is a weighted (by the correspondent matching technology 
elasticities) sum of the effects of the shock on unemployment inflows and on 
vacancy formation. The first effect is negative insofar as a positive shocks involves 
lower inflows into unemployment and therefore less matching next period, while 
the second is positive because of the effects of the shock on vacancy formation and 
hence on job-matching.
Under (13) changes in employment security regulations do not affect POSy, while 
under (13') the impact of policy changes is ambiguous5. However, in both cases 
the tightening o f employment security regulations tends to increase the cyclical 
sensitivity o f gross job creation relative to that o f job destruction. In fact, under 
(13'):
5 In fact, under (13 j:
where the first term is positive by (12) and the convexity of matching technologies, while the 
second is positive.
(13)
POSŶ M uu NEGY - Mu NEGYX



























































































(14)POSy T]oll y  ̂  y'
NEGr ^ V~U +\NEGJ
and by (12) we know that the cyclical sensitivity of job destruction is negatively 
affected by the tightening of employment security regulations. These results imply 
that the responsiveness o f net flows ( NET, the difference between POS and NEG) 
is accrued when employment security regulations become less stringent.
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